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RECENT DEVELOPMENT
AN EXPERT'S RELIANCE ON DNA
ANALYSIS DID NOT OFFEND THE CONFRONTATION
CLAUSE BECAUSE THE UNDERLYING REPORT WAS NOT
SUFFICIENTLY
FORMAL
TO
BE
CONSIDERED
TESTIMONIAL.

DERR V. STATE:

By: James Hetzel
The Court of Appeals of Maryland held that the defendant's right to
confrontation under the Sixth Amendment ("Confrontation Clause") was not
invoked when the State presented expert testimony based on DNA testing not
performed by the expert because the testing in question lacked the requisite
formality to be "testimonial." Derr v. State, 434 Md. 88, 73 A.3d 254
(2013). The court further held that a defendant's statutory and constitutional
discovery rights were not violated when the trial judge refused to order
production of coincidental matches in the FBI's Combined DNA Index
System ("CaDIS"), as the State was not required to create potentially
exculpatory evidence for the defendant. Id at 97-98, 73 A.3d at 259. The
court finally concluded that the DNA evidence presented was sufficient to
sustain the defendant's conviction and that the trial court did not err in
refusing to use the defendant's proposedjury instruction. Id
In December of 1984, an unknown man attacked and raped a woman in
Charles County, Maryland. Following the rape, the victim was transported
to a hospital where medical personnel used a rape kit to collect biological
evidence. The collected evidence was sent to the FBI for testing, but the
case remained unsolved and became inactive. In 2002, the evidence was
resubmitted to the FBI for additional analysis, and the newly generated DNA
profile was entered into CaDIS. Two years later, Derr's existing profile in
CaDIS was matched to the DNA profile generated from the rape kit. Derr
was subsequently indicted by a Charles County Grand Jury for the 1984
attack.
In 2006, Derr was tried in the Circuit Court for Charles County for several
counts of rape and sexual offense. At trial, the State presented Jennifer
Luttman ("Luttman") to testify as an expert in forensic serology and DNA
analysis. Luttman outlined, among other things, background information
regarding DNA analysis, testing procedures, and the creation of DNA
profiles. Luttman and her team were involved in conducting DNA profile
comparisons, and some of the testing in the instant case was performed by
Luttman's team. She acknowledged, however, using the "bench work" of
others to aid in making a final assessment regarding the present case. The
testimony by Luttman was introduced over Derr's objection.
Derr was convicted of first and second degree rape and first and second
degree sexual offense, and appealed to the court of Special Appeals of
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Maryland, challenging his conviction. The Court of Appeals of Maryland
granted certiorari on its own motion before the intermediate appellate court
rendered a decision, and the Court of Appeals of Maryland reversed the
decision of the circuit court and remanded for a new trial. The State then
petitioned the United States Supreme Court for certiorari and requested that
the petition be held pending until the Court decided Williams v. Illinois.
(Later cited as Williams v. Illinois, 132 S. Ct.2221 (2013).) In 2012, the
Supreme Court granted the State's petition for certiorari, vacating the
judgment of the Court of Appeals of Maryland and remanding in light of
Williams.
The Court of Appeals began its analysis by addressing whether preventing
Derr from questioning the creators of the DNA reports, which Luttman relied
upon in her testimony, violated the Confrontation Clause. Derr, 434 Md. at
103, 73 A.3d at 266. The Confrontation Clause provides a criminal
defendant with the right to confront witnesses who testify against him or her
and "only applies when an out-of-court statement constitutes testimonial
hearsay." Id. at 103-06, 73 A.3d at 265-66 (citing Cox v. State, 421 Md. 630,
642, 28 A.3d 687, 694 (2011); Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36
(2004)). The critical inquiry was whether the statement was "testimonial"
and whether it was offered for the truth of the matter asserted. Derr, 434
Md. at 107, 73 A.3d at 265.
The court determined that to be "testimonial" under the Confrontation
Clause, an out-of-court statement must be sufficiently formalized. Derr, 434
Md. at 111-12, 73 A.3d at 267-68 (citing Williams v. Illinois, 132 S. Ct.2221
(2013)). The court concluded that although in Williams there was no
majority opinion, the controlling standard was the position taken by five
Justices, which "require [ed] that a statement be, at a minimum, formalized to
be testimonial." Derr, 434 Md. at 115, 73 A.3d at 270 (determining that
under Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188 (1977), where there was a
fragmented decision, the holding could be viewed as the position of the
Justices who concurred on the narrowest grounds).
The court found that the DNA reports, which were the basis for Luttman's
opinion, were not "testimonial" because they lacked the requisite formality.
Derr, 434 Md. at 118, 73 A.3d at 272. The reports lacked formality because
they had no certifications regarding their procedures or accuracy. Id. at 119,
73 A.3d at 272. Therefore, since the statements were not "testimonial," the
Confrontation Clause was not implicated. Id.
Having determined there was no Confrontation Clause violation, the court
next addressed Derr's discovery rights. Derr, 434 Md. at 121, 73 A.3d at
273-74. In a pre-trial motion that the trial court subsequently denied, Derr
requested that the State be compelled to produce statistics on the probability
of coincidental matching DNA profiles occurring within CaDIS. Id On
appeal, Derr argued that the denial precluded him from proving any potential
errors in the reports. Id. The court held that "the trial court's refusal to order
the FBI to conduct a research project and create potentially useful evidence
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for Derr [did] not violate either his constitutional right to discovery, as
defmed by Brady and its progeny, or Maryland Rule 4-263." Id. at 124, 73
A.3d at 275.
Derr further argued that "there was insufficient evidence as a matter of
law to sustain [his] convictions" because the DNA evidence identifying him
was faulty. In examining the sufficiency of evidence, the court explained
that it looked to whether any "rational trier of fact could have found the
essential elements beyond a reasonable doubt," deferring to any inferences
made. Id. at 129, 73 A.3d at 278 (quoting Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307,
319 (1979». The court determined a rational juror could conclude beyond a
reasonable doubt that Derr was indeed the victim's attacker, therefore the
State had presented sufficient evidence to sustain the conviction. Derr, 434
Md. at 131, 73 A.3d at 280.
Additionally, the court held that the trial court's refusal to give Derr's
requested jury instruction was not erroneous. Derr, 434 Md. at 134, 73 A.3d
at 281. The court noted that proposed instructions need not be given where
the jury instructions protect the defendant's rights and cover the theory of the
defense. Id. (citing Cost v. State, 417 Md. 360, 368-69, 10 A.3d 184, 189
(2010». Here, the court determined the jury instructions passed this test by
instructing the jury members that it was their right to determine the weight
and credibility of the evidence. Derr, 434 Md. at 134, 73 A.3d at 281.
The dissent took issue with the court's Confrontation Clause analysis, and
noted the troubling fact that only one member of the Williams Court voted
for a characterization of "testimonial" that was eventually adopted by the
Derr majority. Derr, 434 Md. at 140, 73 A.3d at 285 (Eldridge, J.,
dissenting). The dissent further pointed out that the Williams decision
ordered the Maryland and Federal provisions to be considered separately, yet
the court did not do so. Id. at 143-46, 73 A.3d at 286-89 (Eldridge, J.,
dissenting). Therefore, rather than attempting to interpret and apply the
fragmented Williams decision, the dissent simply would have elected to
decide Derr solely on state constitutional grounds. Id. at 141, 73 A.3d at 285
(Eldridge, J., dissenting).
In Derr v. State, the Court of Appeals of Maryland held that the
Confrontation Clause was not violated by expert testimony that relied upon
DNA reports which the expert did not personally compile. Thus, the State
may potentially shield questioning of those who conduct underlying reports
if they are kept informal. Further, while the policy of not forcing the State to
produce evidence for defendants is certainly logical, and perhaps fiscally
responsible, the decision of the court is problematic in that it makes
challenging DNA testing increasingly difficult for Maryland practitioners in
cases where DNA testing is at issue.

